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Probabilism is the thesis that an agent is rational only if her cre-
dences are probabilistic. This paper will be concerned with what
we might call the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism
(Rosenkrantz, 1981; Joyce, 1998, 2009). This argument begins with the
claim that the sole source of epistemic value for a credence is its accu-
racy — a credence in a true proposition is more accurate, and thus of
greater epistemic value, the higher it is; a credence in a false proposi-
tion is more accurate, and thus of greater epistemic value, the lower
it is. The argument then proceeds to lay down properties that any nu-
merical measure of the accuracy of credences must have. Finally, it
is shown that, relative to any measure with those properties, the fol-
lowing holds: for any non-probabilistic credences, there are alternative
credences over the same propositions that are guaranteed to be more
accurate. In the language of decision theory, these alternative credences
accuracy-dominate the non-probabilistic credences; they are more ac-
curate however the world turns out to be. Thus, one can tell a priori
that they are more accurate and thus have greater epistemic value.
From this, the argument concludes, it follows that non-probabilistic
credences are irrational, which is exactly what Probabilism says.
In this paper, I wish to identify and explore a lacuna in this argu-
ment. I grant that, if the only doxastic attitudes are credal attitudes, the
argument succeeds. But many philosophers take this not to be the case.
They say that, alongside credences, there are other doxastic attitudes,
such as full beliefs, full disbeliefs, and suspensions of judgment — to
wit, categorical doxastic attitudes, by contrast with credences, which
are graded doxastic attitudes (Kyburg, 1961; Foley, 1992; Leitgeb, 2014;
Fitelson, ms). What’s more, those philosophers typically claim, these
other doxastic attitudes are closely connected to credal attitudes, either
as a matter of necessity — an agent has a belief in a given proposition
just in case she has credences with particular properties, for instance
— or normatively — for instance, if an agent has a belief in a given
proposition, she ought to have credences with particular properties.
Now, since categorical doxastic attitudes are also doxastic attitudes, it
seems that, like credences, the sole source of epistemic value for those
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attitudes is their accuracy. Thus, if we wish to measure the epistemic
value of an agent’s total doxastic state, we must include not only the
accuracy of her credences, but also the accuracy of any full beliefs, dis-
beliefs, and suspensions of judgment that she has as well. However, if
this is the case, there is a problem for the Accuracy Dominance Argu-
ment for Probabilism. After all, for all the argument says, there might
be credences that violate Probabilism of which the following hold:
(i) There are alternative credences in the same propositions that
accuracy-dominate those credences.
(ii) There is no total doxastic state — which includes categorical atti-
tudes as well as credal attitudes — that accuracy-dominates the
total doxastic state to which those credences belong.
After all, for all the argument says, there may be credences that are
accuracy-dominated, but which are parts of total doxastic states that
are not themselves accuracy-dominated by any other total doxastic
state. Now, one might wonder how that could possibly happen: if one
part of a total doxastic state is accuracy-dominated, surely the total
state is dominated by the total state that results from replacing the
dominated part by something that dominates that part and leaving
everything else untouched. However, as I noted above, many philoso-
phers think that the different parts of a total doxastic state are closely
linked. It may not be possible to replace one part of a total state in a
certain way without changing the rest of the total state. For instance, if
there is a necessary connection between credence and belief, it may not
be possible to change an agent’s credences in a particular way without
thereby changing her beliefs. Or, even if there is no necessary connec-
tion and it is possible to change her credences without changing her
beliefs, it may be that, because there is a normative connection between
the two, while the parts of the original total doxastic state — the one
that includes the dominated credences — fit together in the way that
rationality requires them to fit together, the parts of the new doxas-
tic state — the one that includes the dominating credences — do not.
In either case, the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism is
weakened.
The foregoing describes a possibility that the Accuracy Dominance
Argument seems to leave open. Whether it in fact does leave it open
is something we will answer precisely below, where we will also sur-
vey possible responses to the problem. In §1, we present the Accuracy
Dominance Argument for Probabilism; in §2, we describe the lacuna in
this argument that arises if we ignore the possibility of doxastic states
other than credences; in the remaining sections §§3-6, we explore vari-
ous ways we might try to fix the argument.
1. The Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism
We represent the credal part of an agent’s doxastic state by her credence
function c. This is defined on F , the set of propositions towards which
the agent has a doxastic attitude. c takes each proposition X in F and
returns a real number 0 ≤ c(X) ≤ 1 that measures her credence or de-
gree of belief in X. Probabilism is then the following law of credences:
Probabilism An agent is rational only if her credence function
is probabilistic.
The Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism attempts to estab-
lish this law. According to this argument, accuracy is the sole source
of epistemic value for credences. The accuracy of a credence in a true
proposition increases as the credence increases; and the accuracy of
a credence in a false proposition increases as the credence decreases.
This allows us to compare the accuracy of two credences, but it doesn’t
allow us to measure that accuracy and nor does it allow us to compare
two credence functions for accuracy. To do that, we need a measure of
the accuracy of an individual credence at a possible world, and also
a way of aggregating those individual inaccuracies to give the total
inaccuracy of a credence function at a possible world. I will begin by
describing the most popular way of doing this and I will run the Accu-
racy Dominance Argument using that; afterwards, I will show how it
works for a wide variety of alternative ways of doing this.
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In what follows, it will be easier to talk of the inaccuracy of cre-
dences and measures of that quantity rather than accuracy and mea-
sures of that. I take accuracy simply to be inaccuracy with the sign
reversed. Thus, if I is a measure of inaccuracy, −I is a measure of
accuracy.
The most popular measure of the inaccuracy of an individual cre-
dence at a world is the so-called quadratic scoring rule. Let q(i, x) :=
(i − x)2, where i = 0 or 1, and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Then q(1, x) gives the
quadratic scoring rule’s measure of the inaccuracy of credence x in a
true proposition, while q(0, x) gives its measure of the inaccuracy of
credence x in a false proposition. We then define the inaccuracy of a
credence function at a world as the sum of the inaccuracies at that
world of the individual credences it assigns — this is known as the
Brier score. That is, if c is a credence function on F and w is a possible
world, let:
B(c, w) := ∑
X∈F
q(w(X), c(X))
where w(X) is the indicator function of w — that is, w(X) = 1 if X is
true at w; w(X) = 0 if X is false at w. Then B(c, w) is the Brier score of
c at w.
Now consider an agent whom we’ll call Cleo. FCleo = {X, X}. That
is, Cleo has opinions only about a proposition X and its negation. And
suppose her credence function is:
cCleo(X) = 0.7
cCleo(X) = 0.6
So Cleo violates Probabilism — cCleo is not a probability function, since
the credences it assigns to X and X do not sum to 1. Then it turns
out that there are credence functions that are more accurate than cCleo
regardless of whether X is true or false. Figure 1 illustrates the point.
w1
w2
cCleo
c∗
Figure 1: We plot a credence function c defined on F = {X, X} as the point
(c(X), c(X)) in the unit square. Thus, cCleo = (0.7, 0.6). We also plot the
indicator functions w1 and w2 of the two possible worlds: X is true at w1
and false at w2. They are (1, 0) and (0, 1), respectively. Represented in this
way, the Brier score of a credence function c at wi is the square of the Eu-
clidean distance that the credence function lies from the indicator function of
wi. The diagonal line represents the set of credence functions on F that satisfy
Probabilism — it is precisely those functions c for which c(X) + c(X) = 1.
The lower-right and upper-left blue arcs represent the credence functions that
are exactly as inaccurate as cCleo at w1 and w2, respectively. The credence
functions that lie inside the overlap between those two arcs are those that
accuracy-dominate cCleo — they are less inaccurate at w1 and less inaccurate
at w2. c∗ = (0.55, 0.45) is one of them.
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Now, on its own, this doesn’t show that cCleo is irrational. Some of
the credence functions that dominate cCleo are themselves dominated.
If all of them were, cCleo wouldn’t be irrational — there is nothing ir-
rational about being dominated by an option that is itself dominated
(Pettigrew, 2013, §3). However, there are some credence functions that
dominate cCleo but aren’t themselves dominated. In fact, the ones that
aren’t themselves dominated are precisely those amongst them that
satisfy Probabilism. In Figure 1, c∗ is such a credence function. Thus,
cCleo is irrational: accuracy is the sole source of epistemic value; and
there are credence functions that have greater accuracy than c regard-
less of how the world turns out; and some of these credence functions
aren’t themselves accuracy-dominated in this way. This is one version
of the accuracy dominance argument for the irrationality of cCleo: it is
the version that assumes that the inaccuracy of a credence function is
given by its Brier score.
The following theorem shows that the argument generalises to give
an argument for the irrationality of any non-probabilistic credence
function:
Theorem 1 (de Finetti)
(I) If c is non-probabilistic, there is a probabilistic c∗ such that, for all worlds w,
B(c∗, w) < B(c, w)
(II) If c is probabilistic, there is no c∗ 6= c such that, for all worlds w,
B(c∗, w) ≤ B(c, w)
This gives one version of the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Prob-
abilism — it is the version that assumes that the inaccuracy of a cre-
dence function is given by its Brier score. But there is a stronger version
that gains its strength by weakening that assumption. On this stronger
version, all that is assumed is that the inaccuracy of a credence function
is given by an inaccuracy measure generated by a continuous, strictly
proper scoring rule: the quadratic scoring rule is a continuous, strictly
proper scoring rule, and it generates the Brier score, but there are many
others. I will give the definition here, but I will do little to motivate the
claim that inaccuracy measures ought to be generated in such a way,
since that will have little to do with the arguments I give below.
A scoring rule is a function s : {0, 1} × [0, 1] → [0,∞]. As in the
case of the quadratic scoring rule, we take s(1, x) to measure the inac-
curacy of the credence x in a true proposition and s(0, x) to measure
the inaccuracy of x in a false proposition. A scoring rule is continuous
if s(1, x) and s(0, x) are continuous functions of x. A scoring rule is
strictly proper if the following holds: for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
ps(1, x) + (1− p)s(0, x)
is uniquely minimised (as a function of x) at x = p. That is,
ps(1, p) + (1− p)s(0, p) ≤ ps(1, x) + (1− p)s(0, x)
for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, with equality iff x = p. Thus, a strictly proper
scoring rule makes probabilistic credences immodest: any probabilistic
credences in X and X — that is, any p and 1− p, respectively, for some
0 ≤ p ≤ 1 — will expect the inaccuracy of the credence in X — that is,
p — to have lower inaccuracy than they will expect any other credence
in X to have. Joyce (2009) argues that this is a desirable feature of an
inaccuracy measure. Given a continuous, strictly proper scoring rule s,
we define an inaccuracy measure Is for credence functions as follows
Is(c, w) := ∑
X∈F
s(w(X), c(X))
We say that Is is generated by s. Here are two further examples of con-
tinuous, strictly proper scoring rules:
• Logarithmic scoring rule
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– l(1, x) = − log x
– l(0, x) = − log (1− x)
• Spherical scoring rule
– r(1, x) = − r√
r2+(1−r)2
– r(0, x) = − 1−r√
r2+(1−r)2
We then have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Predd, et al., 2009) Suppose s is a continuous, strictly proper
scoring rule. And let Is be the inaccuracy measure it generates. Then
(I) If c is non-probabilistic, there is a probabilistic c∗ such that, for all worlds w,
Is(c∗, w) < Is(c, w)
(II) If c is probabilistic, there is no c∗ 6= c such that, for all worlds w,
Is(c∗, w) ≤ Is(c, w)
Thus, not only is every non-probabilistic credence function accuracy-
dominated by undominated alternatives when accuracy is measured
by the Brier score; they are also all accuracy-dominated by undomi-
nated alternatives when accuracy is measured by an inaccuracy mea-
sure that is generated by a continuous, strictly proper scoring rule.
We are now in a position to state the strongest version of the Accu-
racy Dominance Argument for Probabilism:
(1) Veritism Accuracy is the sole source of epistemic value for a dox-
astic state.
(2) Strict Propriety The inaccuracy of a credence function is measured
by a continuous, strictly proper scoring rule.
(3) Dominance It is irrational to adopt an option that is strictly dom-
inated by an alternative option that is not itself even weakly domi-
nated.
(4) Theorem 2.
Therefore,
(5) Probabilism An agent is rational only if her credence function is
probabilistic.
2. A lacuna in the argument
To illustrate the lacuna in the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Prob-
abilism, I will sketch a response that Cleo might make to the charge of
irrationality that is brought against her by that argument. Recall: Cleo
has credence 0.7 in X and 0.6 in X. Her imagined response has three
parts: the first is a claim about the connection between credal attitudes
and categorical attitudes, such as full belief, full disbelief, and suspen-
sion of judgment; the second is a claim about how the inaccuracy of an
agent’s total doxastic state ought to be measured when that state con-
sists of credences and full beliefs; the third is the observation that her
total doxastic state, which includes her credence function cCleo, as well
as her categorical doxastic attitudes, is not accuracy-dominated given
the inaccuracy measure for total doxastic states that she has described
in the second part.
2.1 The Lockean Thesis
The first part of Cleo’s imagined response is the so-called Lockean
Thesis (Foley, 1992). Roughly, the Lockean Thesis says this: an agent
has a belief in a proposition just in case she has a sufficiently high
credence in it; she has a disbelief in it just in case she has a sufficiently
low credence in it; and otherwise she suspends judgment on it. To
make it precise, we need to say what counts as sufficiently high and
sufficiently low credence; and we need to say what modal strength the
claim has. To address the first, we simply fix a threshold 12 < t ≤ 1
and state the Lockean Thesis as follows, where an agent’s categorical
attitudes — her beliefs, disbeliefs, and suspensions — are represented
by her belief function b : F → {B, D, S}; thus, if an agent has belief
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function b, we have b(X) = B iff she believes X, and so on.
Lockean Thesis with threshold t (LT[t]) If an agent has credence
function c and belief function b, then:
c(X) > t ⇒ b(X) = B
1− t < c(X) < t ⇒ b(X) = S
c(X) < 1− t ⇒ b(X) = D
c(X) = t ⇒ b(X) = B or S
c(X) = 1− t ⇒ b(X) = D or S
Thus, if an agent’s credence exceeds the threshold for full belief, she
has a full belief; if it lies on the threshold, she has either a full belief
or she suspends judgment. Similarly for full disbelief. And in all other
cases, she suspends judgment. We say that a total doxastic state (b, c)
consisting of belief function b and credence function c is a Lockeant state
if it satisfies LT[t].
Now we must consider the modal strength of the Lockean Thesis.
There are, I think, three versions that it will be useful to distinguish:
• LT[t] (Analytic) It is analytic that LT[t].
• LT[t] (Metaphysical) It is metaphysically necessary that LT[t].
• LT[t] (Normative) It is normatively required that LT[t].
Thus, on the analytic version, beliefs are nothing over and above suf-
ficiently high credences: to say that someone believes a proposition
is simply to say that they have a sufficiently high credence in it. On
the metaphysical version, by contrast, credences and categorical atti-
tudes are distinct existences, but there is a metaphysically necessary
connection between them. Finally, on the normative version, the dis-
tinct existences have no necessary connection, but there is a normative
connection: to have a high credence but no belief is metaphysically
possible, but it is irrational; and similarly for disbelief and suspension.
I will state Cleo’s response to the charge of irrationality in terms of
the metaphysical version of the Lockean Thesis — LT[t] (Metaphysical)
— but I will consider whether she can make a similar response by
appealing to the other, weaker versions in later sections of the paper.
I will conclude that the metaphysical and normative versions serve
her well, while the analytic does not. Indeed, I will argue that the
proponent of the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism who
accepts any version of the Lockean Thesis ought to endorse the analytic
version formulated above.
It is an interesting question whether any analogous problem for the
Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism arises for accounts
of the relationship between credence and belief other than the Lock-
ean Thesis. However, it is difficult to answer since some of the most
promising such accounts apply only to probabilistic agents: that is,
they only assert credal conditions on belief, disbelief, and suspension
of judgment if the credences in question are probabilistic (Arló-Costa
and Pedersen, 2012; Leitgeb, 2014).
2.2 Measuring the accuracy of full beliefs
According to the first part of Cleo’s response, an agent who has cre-
dences also has categorical attitudes, such as beliefs, disbeliefs, and
suspensions of judgment. Thus, her doxastic state is richer than is rep-
resented in the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. Now,
that wouldn’t matter if the other parts of her doxastic state made no
contribution to the overall epistemic value of her total doxastic state
— the state that includes credal and categorical attitudes. But, in the
second part of her response, Cleo claims that they do. As a proponent
of the metaphysical version of the Lockean Thesis, Cleo maintains that
categorical attitudes and credal attitudes are distinct existences. While
they are intimately linked by the Lockean Thesis, they nonetheless con-
tribute differently to the inaccuracy of any total doxastic state of which
they are a part. As we saw above, the inaccuracy of a credence function
at a world is measured by an inaccuracy measure that is generated by
a continuous, strictly proper scoring rule. We turn now to saying how
we measure the inaccuracy of an agent’s belief function at a world.
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As before, we begin by measuring the inaccuracy of each individual
attitude; then we sum them up. Thus, we say how inaccurate is a belief
in a true proposition, a suspension in a false proposition, and so on.
The idea is that there is an inaccuracy that attaches to ‘getting things
wrong’ — following Easwaran (ms), we denote it W and it attaches to
a false belief and true disbelief — and an inaccuracy that attaches to
‘getting things right’ — again following Easwaran (ms), we denote it R
and it attaches to a true belief and a false disbelief — and an inaccuracy
that attaches to suspending judgment in a proposition, regardless of
its truth or falsity — we denote it N. Thus, we define the function
i : {0, 1} × {B, D, S} → [0, 1] as follows — this is the analogue of a
scoring rule for credences:
• i(1, B) = i(0, D) = R
• i(0, B) = i(1, D) = W
• i(1, S) = i(0, S) = N
Throughout most of the paper, we will make the natural assumption
that R = 0 and W = 1.1
As before, we define the inaccuracy measure for belief functions
that is generated by i as follows:
Ii(b, w) := ∑
X∈F
i(w(X), b(X))
We say that Ii is generated by i.
Now, suppose our agent’s credence function is c and her belief func-
tion is b. And suppose s is our measure of the inaccuracy of a credence,
while i is our measure of the inaccuracy of a categorical attitude. Then
the inaccuracy of her total doxastic state (b, c) is defined as follows:
Ii,s((b, c), w) := Ii(b, w) + Is(c, w)
1. Since any other values can be transformed into these by a positive linear
transformation, we do not lose any generality by doing this.
2.3 Cleo undominated
The final part of Cleo’s response to the Accuracy Dominance Argu-
ment brings the first and second part together. Cleo notes a particu-
lar mathematical fact: there is a Lockean threshold t, an inaccuracy
measure for credence functions Is, and an inaccuracy measure for be-
lief functions Ii such that, if (bCleo, cCleo) is the Lockeant state that
includes cCleo as a part, then there is no Lockeant state (b∗, c∗) that
accuracy-dominates (bCleo, cCleo) when accuracy is measured by Ii,s.
Thus, while there are alternative credences that Cleo may adopt that
are guaranteed to make the credal part of her doxastic state more accu-
rate, by adopting them — or indeed by adopting any other credences
— she would thereby adopt a total doxastic state that does not domi-
nate hers; that is, she would adopt a total doxastic state that is more
inaccurate than hers in at least one possible world. She submits that,
while this does not ensure that her credences are rational, it does show
that any irrationality does not stem from considerations of accuracy
dominance.
Let’s consider Cleo’s response in a little more detail. Here is a result
on which she might rely.
Theorem 3
• Let t = 0.7. That is, the Lockean threshold for belief is 0.7 and the threshold
for disbelief is 0.3.
• Let the inaccuracy of a credence be measured by the quadratic scoring rule q;
and let the inaccuracy of a credence function be measured by the Brier score it
generates B = Iq.
• Let the inaccuracy of a categorical doxastic state be measured by i, where
R = 0, N = 0.3, and W = 1; and let the inaccuracy of a belief function be
measured by the inaccuracy measure it generates, namely, Ii.
Thus, the score of a maximally accurate credence — i.e. credence 1 in a truth
or credence 0 in a falsehood — is the same as the score of a maximally accurate
categorical state — i.e. a true belief or a false disbelief: it is 0. And similarly
for a maximally inaccurate credence and a maximally inaccurate categorical
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state: both score 1.
Then there is no Lockeant state (b∗, c∗) that accuracy-dominates (bCleo, cCleo)
when accuracy is measured by Ii,q.
The theorem is proved in the Appendix (§8). The following gives an
idea of how the proof goes: All of the credence functions that dominate
Cleo’s credence function assign credences to X and X that lie between
t = 0.7 and 1 − t = 0.3. Thus, they all belong to Lockean0.7 states
that assign suspension of judgment to both propositions. On the other
hand, Cleo’s credences belong to a Lockean0.7 state that includes full
belief in X and suspension in X. Thus, when X is true, Cleo’s belief
function is more accurate than the belief function corresponding to any
credence function that accuracy-dominates hers. What’s more, it turns
out, the gain in accuracy obtained by Cleo’s categorical attitudes if X
is true outweighs the loss in accuracy suffered by her credal attitudes;
and so the total doxastic state is not dominated. Figure 2 illustrates
this.
This, then, is Cleo’s defence against the charge of irrationality. In
the remainder of the paper, I will consider objections to this response.
As we will see, it proves to be quite resilient. I will begin (in §3) by con-
sidering the claim that, just as it is irrational to have a total doxastic
state that is accuracy-dominated, so it is irrational to have a total doxas-
tic state some part of which is accuracy-dominated. Then I will consider
how Cleo’s response fares in the presence of the different versions of
the Lockean Thesis formulated above (§4-5). Finally, I will ask how sen-
sitive Cleo’s response is to the choice of threshold (§6.1) and inaccuracy
measure (§6.2) that was made in Theorem 3, and to the formulation of
the Lockean Thesis LT[t] (§6.3).
3. Is partial dominance irrational?
We are imagining that Cleo responds to the Accuracy Dominance Ar-
gument against her by saying that, while her credences are accuracy-
dominated, the total doxastic state of which they are a part is not. How-
ever, a natural objection to this response is to claim that, just as it is
w1
w2
cCleo
c∗
Figure 2: The dashed lines represent the Lockean thresholds: the horizontal
lines mark the thresholds for belief and disbelief in X; the vertical lines mark
the thresholds for belief and disbelief in X. Note that all credence functions
that dominate cCleo correspond to the belief function that assigns suspension
to X and to X.
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clearly irrational to have a total doxastic state that is accuracy dom-
inated, so it is also irrational to have a total doxastic state some part
of which is accuracy dominated. And this is especially so in situations
in which there are alternative total states no part of which is accuracy
dominated. Now, that is the situation in which Cleo finds herself, since
it turns out that, if (b, c) is a Lockeant state and c is probabilistic, there
is no (b∗, c∗) some part of which dominates the corresponding part of
(b, c).2 So she isn’t forced to be in the situation of being dominated
in part; there are available options that are not. Nonetheless, she has
picked an option that is. Does this make her irrational? I think not.
Consider the following situation: I must choose Option 1 or Option
2. Whichever I choose, I’ll receive a gift from my friend Phil and a gift
from my friend Rachel; what the gift is depends on which world we’re
in, w1 or w2. Here are the options:
• Option 1:
w1 w2
Phil £5 £5
Rachel £10 £10
• Option 2:
w1 w2
Phil £10 £10
Rachel £20 £2
2. The reason is that, as we will see in §4 below, if (b, c) is Lockeant and c is
probabilistic, then c expects the inaccuracy of b, and thus the inaccuracy of (b, c)
to be minimal, if the inaccuracy of b is measured by i (with i(i, S) = N = 1− t)
and the inaccuracy of c measured by a strictly proper scoring rule s. If an option
has minimal expected inaccuracy, it cannot be accuracy dominated.
Suppose I pick Option 1. Now, part of the outcome of that option —
namely, the gift bestowed by Phil — is dominated by the corresponding
part of Option 2: on Option 2, Phil gives me £10 for sure; on Option 1,
he gives me £5 for sure. Moreover, no part of Option 2 is dominated
by the corresponding part of Option 1: neither Phil’s gift nor Rachel’s
is guaranteed to be better on Option 1 than on Option 2. Nonetheless,
it is clear that my choice of Option 1 is not thereby irrational. The
upshot: being dominated in part is not sufficient for irrationality, even
when the option that dominates in part is not itself dominated in part.
4. The normative version of the Lockean Thesis
The Lockean Thesis is often understood, not as having any modal force,
but rather as having normative force. This is the content of LT[t] (Nor-
mative) from above. It says that credal and categorical attitudes are dis-
tinct existences that are not tied together by any modality, but nonethe-
less are rationally required to interact in the way stated in the Lockean
Thesis. If we adopt this version of the Lockean Thesis, what becomes
of Cleo’s response?
We know that Cleo’s total doxastic state is not dominated by any
Lockeant state, but is dominated by a non-Lockeant state. Thus, in the
presence of LT[t] (Normative), Cleo is dominated by an irrational state,
but not by any rational state. Thus, our question is this: Is it sufficient
for irrationality to be dominated by an irrational option?
At first, it might seem that it is. After all, if an option is dominated
by an irrational option, this is surely an even more serious indictment
than if it is dominated only by a rational one. If even the irrational
options are guaranteed to be better than yours, you must be doing
really badly. But this is too quick. Such an argument might go through
if the irrationality of non-Lockeant states has its source solely in their
inaccuracy. If we know that one state is dominated by another that is
irrational, and we know that the dominating state is irrational because
it is suboptimal with respect to accuracy, then we may be able to infer
that the original state is also suboptimal with respect to its accuracy
and therefore irrational. However, if the irrationality of a non-Lockeant
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state has its source elsewhere, then the inference is not warranted.
I’ll begin by expanding on this latter point. Then I will consider
how LT[t] (Normative) might follow from accuracy considerations. I
will argue that, in neither case is dominance by a non-Lockeant (and
thus irrational) state sufficient for irrationality. Thus, in the presence of
LT[t] (Normative), I submit, Cleo’s response succeeds.
Let us consider, then, the case in which LT[t] (Normative) is true,
but the irrationality of violating it comes not from considerations of
accuracy, but from elsewhere. Let’s begin by asking why, in this case,
Cleo’s response works. After that, we will ask from where else the nor-
mative force of the Lockean Thesis might come. Thus, we are suppos-
ing that LT[t] (Normative) is true, but that the source of its normative
force does not lie in considerations of accuracy; and we know that Cleo
is dominated only by non-Lockeant (and thus irrational) states. To see
why she is not thereby irrational, consider an analogous case, namely,
Philippa Foot’s famous Trolley Problem (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976).
In the Trolley Problem, we have two options: on Option A, we
change the route of the trolley, one person is killed and five are saved;
on Option B, we do not change the route, five people are killed and
one is saved. Which is the correct option to choose? We might reason
as follows (though of course this is not the only view we might take of
the Trolley Problem). Taking into account only considerations of utility,
A is the correct option, since it dominates B — five lives give rise to
more utility than one. But when we take into account other consider-
ations, such as the impermissibility of intentional killing, Option A is
ruled out from the start; it is impermissible before the utility consid-
erations come into play. Thus, although B is a dominated action, it is
dominated only by an alternative option that is impermissible. And
this isn’t sufficient to rule it out as a permissible action. The upshot of
this is that the badness of being dominated depends on the nature of
the dominating option. If that dominating option is impermissible for
other reasons — reasons not captured by the utility function — then
the option it dominates is not necessarily irrational.
Now, the utility of a doxastic state is its accuracy. Thus, an analo-
gous point applies: if one doxastic state is dominated by another that is
impermissible for other reasons — reasons not encoded in the inaccu-
racy measure — then the state it dominates is not necessarily irrational.
In particular, it is no indictment of Cleo’s rationality that her state is
dominated by a non-Lockeant alternative, if the irrationality of that
alternative stems from something other than its inaccuracy.3
Now, what other source of irrationality might there be? It might be,
for instance, that there are basic, brute norms of doxastic consistency.
Thus, it might be a brute normative fact — that is, one not justified
by any more basic normative facts, and in particular not justified by
appeal to accuracy considerations — that it is irrational to have a dox-
astic state that does not present a consistent set of attitudes towards
the world. This is analogous to the Trolley Problem case, where there
is a brute normative fact that acts that involve intentional killing are
impermissible — this fact, we might suppose, is not justified by more
basic normative facts, in particular, not by facts about utility. If that’s
the case, it’s plausible that an agent with credence 0.9 in proposition X
along with a full disbelief in X is failing to present a consistent set of
attitudes towards the world: they are akin to an agent with full belief
X and full disbelief in X.
Such a move would support Cleo’s response by rendering the states
that dominate hers irrational and thus impermissible, and thereby
rendering the fact of their dominance irrelevant to her rationality.
Nonetheless, I would advise against the move. After all, a key premise
of the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism is Veritism, the
3. In their “evidentialist” worry about the Accuracy Dominance Argument for
Probabilism, Easwaran and Fitelson (2012) claim that evidence imposes norma-
tive constraints on the credences of any agent that has that evidence, and that
violating these constraints renders an agent’s credence function impermissible
in a way that does not depend on accuracy considerations. They then argue
that there are non-probabilistic credence functions that satisfy certain eviden-
tial constraints and are dominated only by credence functions that violate those
evidential constraints. They conclude that the accuracy dominance argument
fails to show that these credence functions are irrational for agents with the
relevant evidence since they are dominated only by impermissible credence
functions. See (Pettigrew, 2013) for a response.
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view that the sole source of epistemic value for doxastic states is their
accuracy. The account of the irrationality of non-Lockeant states just
presented suggests that there is some extra source of value so that
value accrues to a doxastic state in virtue of it being consistent in a cer-
tain way. If that is genuinely extra value — that is, if it is not value that
already accrues to the state in virtue of its accuracy — then Veritism
must be false. Thus, if Cleo wishes to appeal to LT[t] (Normative) to
defend herself against the Accuracy Dominance Argument, she will
need to justify it by appeal to the virtue of accuracy alone.
Now, as Carl Hempel observed (Hempel, 1962, §12), and as Kenny
Easwaran has developed in detail (Easwaran, ms), there is an accuracy-
based justification of LT[t] (Normative). I will describe this now and
ask whether Cleo might appeal to it in her response to the Accuracy
Dominance Argument.
Suppose an agent has a probabilistic credence function c. And sup-
pose she is deciding which categorical doxastic state she should adopt.
The natural suggestion is that she ought to choose a categorical state
that minimises expected inaccuracy by the lights of her probabilistic
credence function and relative to the inaccuracy measure for categori-
cal states that was described above. That is, she ought to adopt a belief
function b such that, for all belief functions b′, we have
∑
w
c(w)i(b, w) ≤∑
w
c(w)i(b′, w)
As Hempel and Easwaran have shown, if we assume that R = 0 and
W = 1 and N is closer to R than to W, then b miminizes expected
inaccuracy by the lights of c iff (b, c) is a Lockean1−N state.4 Thus, at
least for agents with probabilistic credence function, LT[1− N] (Nor-
mative) follows from considerations of accuracy alone. If one makes
the further assumption that, for agents with the same credence in an
4. More generally, if N = 0 and R < W, then b minimises expected inaccuracy
by the lights of c iff (b, c) is a Lockean W
R+W
state.
individual proposition, the same categorical doxastic attitudes towards
that proposition are permissible, we then obtain LT[1−N] (Normative)
for all agents, probabilistic or not. Let us grant this. Can Cleo then use
it in her response to the Accuracy Dominance Argument that charges
her with irrationality? That is, can she defend her dominated state by
pointing out that it is dominated only by irrational states, where their
irrationality lies in their violation of LT[1− N] (Normative)?
At first, and for similar reasons to those entertained above, it might
seem not. For instance, we know that Cleo’s state (bCleo, cCleo) is dom-
inated by (bCleo, c∗). We also know that (bCleo, c∗) violates LT[1− N]
(Normative) when N = 0.3. Thus, we know that there is a belief func-
tion b∗ 6= bCleo such that c∗ expects b∗ to be more accurate than c∗ ex-
pects bCleo to be. Thus, we might think: Cleo’s total state (bCleo, cCleo)
is dominated by (bCleo, c∗); and, from the point of view of (bCleo, c∗),
the total state (b∗, c∗) is an optimal doxastic state. Thus, for dominance
reasons, we ought to prefer (bCleo, c∗) to (bCleo, cCleo); and then for
expected accuracy reasons, we ought to prefer (b∗, c∗) to (bCleo, c∗).
Thus, by the transitivity of preference, we ought to prefer (b∗, c∗) to
(bCleo, cCleo). Thus, Cleo is irrational, since there is an available option
that ought to be preferred to the one she has adopted.
However, there is an illegitimate move in this argument. We know
that there is b∗ such that c∗ expects b∗ to be more accurate than it
expects bCleo to be. And we moved from this to the claim that, from
the point of view of (bCleo, c∗), the total state (b∗, c∗) is better than
(bCleo, c∗) itself. But that move is not warranted. It is true that, from
the point of view of part of (bCleo, c∗) — namely, the credal part c∗ —
(b∗, c∗) is better than (bCleo, c∗). But it does not follow from this that
the same is true from the point of view of the total state (bCleo, c∗). After
all, if we instead ask which state is optimal from the point of view of
bCleo — that is, the other part of the total state — we would most likely
receive as an answer a state that includes bCleo as its belief function.
And if we ask what is better from the point of view of the whole state
(bCleo, c∗), it isn’t at all clear what the verdict would be.
What we have just encountered is an instance of a more general
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problem that arises when one seeks guidance from a doxastic state
that doesn’t present a consistent attitude to the world: different parts
of such a state often give rise to different and incompatible prefer-
ence orderings. This is what Dutch Book arguments are often taken
to dramatise (cf. the “divided mind” interpretation in [Armendt, 1993]
that is criticised by Vineberg [2001]. In the Dutch Book argument, a
credence in A ∨ B determines one preference ordering over bets on
that proposition, while credences in A and in B together determine
another preference ordering on essentially the same bets. Only if the
credence in the disjunction is the sum of the credences in the mutu-
ally exclusive disjuncts do we obtain compatible preference orderings.
This is one sense in which a non-probabilistic credence function consti-
tutes an inconsistent attitude towards the world. Here is another sim-
ilar way. Suppose c is a credence function and we have two partitions
{w1, w2, w3, w4} and {w1 ∨w2, w3 ∨w4}, where c(w1) + . . .+ c(w4) = 1
and c(w1 ∨ w2) + c(w3 ∨ w4) = 1. If we wish to use this credence
function to choose between two options each of which has the same
utility at worlds w1 and w2 and at worlds w3 and w4, then we
can use credences over either partition to calculate the expected util-
ity. But, unless c is probabilistic and c(A ∨ B) = c(A) + c(B) and
c(C ∨ D) = c(C) + c(D), then these two expected utility calculations
might give rise to different preference orderings. The same happens
in the case in hand here. We cannot infer from the fact that (b∗, c∗) is
better than some other state by the lights of c∗ that it is better than
that other state by the lights of (bCleo, c∗). While we may infer — as the
Hempel-Easwaran argument for LT[1−N] (Normative) does in fact in-
fer — from the fact that c expects b∗ to be more accurate than it expects
b to be that (b, c) is an irrational total state, we cannot infer anything
about what the state (b, c) prefers, and in particular we cannot infer
whether or not it prefers (b∗, c) to itself.
Thus, again, it seems Cleo’s response is saved. While there are total
states that dominate hers, they are all irrational. And this, we have
argued, makes their existence irrelevant to Cleo’s rationality.
5. The analytic version of the Lockean Thesis
So far, we have considered Cleo’s response to the Accuracy Dominance
Argument in the presence of two versions of the Lockean Thesis: the
metaphysical and the normative versions. We have seen that Cleo’s
response works in the presence of both. In each of these versions of
the thesis, categorical doxastic states and credal doxastic states are dis-
tinct existences. In this penultimate section, we consider the remain-
ing version of the Lockean Thesis, namely, LT[t] (Analytic). On this
version, doxastic states and credal states are not distinct existences: in-
deed, each doxastic state is merely a species of credal state. That is,
when we say that an agent has a full belief in X, we say no more than
that she has a sufficiently high credence in X. Thus, ‘Cleo believes X’
is akin to ‘Cleo is tall’: in the latter case, the proposition says simply
that Cleo’s height is in a given range; likewise, in the former case, the
proposition says simply that Cleo’s credence in X is in a given range.5
Now, if this is the case — if full belief and disbelief are reduced to suffi-
ciently high and low credence, respectively — it cannot be that having
a true full belief lends extra accuracy to one’s total doxastic state over
and above the accuracy obtained from having the high credence that
underlies that full belief ascription. Thus, in the presence of LT[t] (An-
alytic), the correct inaccuracy measure for a total doxastic state (b, c)
is:
Is((b, c), w) := Is(c, w)
That is, the inaccuracy of the total state is just the inaccuracy of the
credal part — the belief function adds nothing more, since it is nothing
5. Also, if we consider again how we formulated the Lockean Thesis, we see
another analogy between the two propositions: the predicates in both cases —
‘believes’ and ‘is tall’ — admit borderline cases. In the latter case, if Cleo is
5’9”, it is undetermined whether or not she is tall. In the former case, if Cleo
has credence t in X, it is undetermined whether Cleo believes X or suspends
judgment; and similarly, if she has credence 1 − t in X, it is undetermined
whether Cleo disbelieves X or suspends judgment.
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more than a coarse-grained summary of the credence function. In this
case, then, Cleo’s response fails: after all, her total state (bCleo, cCleo)
is accuracy dominated by the Lockeant state (b∗, c∗) when inaccuracy
is measured in the way just described. This, I submit, is how the pro-
ponent of the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism should
respond to Cleo’s defence.
6. The robustness of Cleo’s response
We have just seen that the proponent of the Accuracy Dominance Ar-
gument for Probabilism can avoid Cleo’s response by adopting LT[t]
(Analytic). But perhaps they need not do so. Perhaps Cleo’s response
depends crucially on some detail that might be questioned. In this sec-
tion, we ask how robust Cleo’s response is. Does it depends crucially
on the particular threshold that was chosen? Or on the scoring rule
used to measure the inaccuracy of the credences? Or on the inaccu-
racies assigned to getting it right, getting it wrong, and suspending?
Or on the formulation of the non-modal part of the Lockean Thesis,
namely, LT[t]?
If that were the case, then one might restore the Accuracy Domi-
nance Argument by ruling out the Brier score as a legitimate measure
of the inaccuracy of credence functions; or by showing by example that
the Lockean threshold t = 0.7 is too low or too high; or by arguing that
suspensions should be deemed more inaccurate than Cleo deems them,
or less; or one might feel that belief requires credence strictly above the
threshold by contrast with the formulation of the Lockean Thesis pre-
sented above, which permits belief at the threshold. And indeed con-
cerns have been raised, in a different context, about the legitimacy of
the Brier score (Levinstein, 2012). And it is probably true that t = 0.7 is
too low a threshold for belief — when I roll a die, is it rational to have
a full belief that it won’t land 1? Moreover, one might well think that
suspensions are treated too leniently by Cleo’s inaccuracy measure. We
will consider each of these concerns in turn.
6.1 Sensitivity to choice of threshold
The first thing to say is that, if the Lockean threshold increases, Cleo’s
total doxastic state will become non-Lockean relative to the new thresh-
old. Moreover, if she retains the credal part of that state — namely,
cCleo — and adopts the belief function that is required by the Lockean
Thesis with the new threshold, her total state will be dominated, re-
gardless of whether the inaccuracy of suspension changes. For, in this
case, her new belief function will assign suspensions of judgment to X
and to X. And these are the same categorical attitudes to which the cre-
dence functions that dominate her credence function give rise via the
Lockean Thesis. Thus, the Lockean states to which those dominated
credence functions belong will dominate her total state.
However, such a move will only buy the Accuracy Dominance Ar-
gument a little time, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 4 For all Lockean thresholds t, there is a Lockeant state (b, c) such
that:
(i) c is non-probabilistic;
(ii) There is no Lockeant state (b∗, c∗) that accuracy-dominates (b, c) when accu-
racy is measured by Ii,q, where i is given by R = 0, N = 1− t, W = 1.
The proof is given in the Appendix (§8). Thus, while it is true that, if the
Lockean threshold is shifted upwards, Cleo will become dominated,
this doesn’t save the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism,
for there will be other non-probabilistic credence functions that belong
to Lockean total doxastic states that are not dominated.
6.2 Sensitivity to choice of inaccuracy measure
Our second theorem addresses those who are concerned not with the
threshold that Cleo has chosen, but with the scoring rule. To state this
theorem, we need some definitions.
• We say that a scoring rule is normalised if s(0, 0) = s(1, 1) = 0 and
s(0, 1) = s(1, 0) = 1.
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• We say that a scoring rule generates a connected inaccuracy measure
Is if, for each credence function, the set of credence functions that
dominates it is either empty or connected (in the topological sense).
The spherical and quadratic scoring rules are continuous, normalised,
connected, and strictly proper; the logarithmic scoring rule is not.
Theorem 5 Suppose s is a continuous, normalised strictly proper scoring
rule that generates a connected inaccuracy measure Is. Then there is 0.5 <
r ≤ 1 such that, for all Lockean thresholds t ≥ r, there is a Lockeant state
(b, c) such that
(i) c is non-probabilistic;
(ii) There is no Lockeant state (b∗, c∗) that accuracy-dominates (b, c) when ac-
curacy is measured by Ii,s, where i is given by R = 0, N = 1 − t, and
W = 1.
The proof is given in the Appendix (§8). Thus, Cleo’s strategy does not
depend crucially on measuring the inaccuracy of credences using the
quadratic scoring rule. For many ways of measuring the inaccuracy of
credences, there are thresholds t and Lockeant states containing non-
probabilistic credence functions that are undominated.
6.3 A stricter Lockean Thesis
So we have seen that Cleo’s defence is not very sensitive either to the
Lockean threshold we choose, nor to the inaccuracy measure we use.
However, as it stands, it does seem to be sensitive to the formulation
of the Lockean Thesis. In this section, we explore this sensitivity.
According to the formulation we gave above — that is, LT[t] — an
agent has a full belief if her credence is above the upper threshold t and
a full disbelief if her credence is below the lower threshold 1− t; and
she suspends judgment if she has a credence that lies strictly between
them. But the categorical state she is in if she lies on either threshold
is undetermined: if she lies on the upper threshold, then she either
suspends or has a full belief; if she lies on the lower threshold, then
she either suspends of has a full disbelief. But what happens if we
remove this indeterminacy at the thresholds?
There are two ways to do this: on the first, non-strict version, a
credence on the upper threshold gives a full belief, and a credence on
the lower threshold gives a full disbelief; on the second, strict version,
a credence on either threshold results in suspension of judgment.
It’s clear that Cleo’s response will still work in the presence of the
non-strict version. After all, Cleo’s total doxastic state (bCleo, cCleo) sat-
isfies that version; and the set of total states permitted by that version
is a proper subset of the set of total states permitted by the original
version of the Lockean Thesis. So, since Cleo is undominated in the
presence of the original Lockean Thesis, she is undominated in the
presence of the non-strict one.
Now, it is also the case that the set of states permitted by the strict
version of the Lockean Thesis is a proper subset of the set of states
permitted by the original version. But, in this case, Cleo’s own state
is not amongst them. That is, Cleo herself does not satisfy the strict
Lockean Thesis (for the threshold t = 0.7) — after all, she has a full
belief in X, but her credence in X lies on the threshold t = 0.7. So,
while she is not dominated by a strictly Lockeant state, this has little
force against the charge of irrationality since her own state is not itself
strictly Lockeant.
Suppose, however, that we consider a state (bTheo, cTheo) where
cTheo is not probabilistic, but the total state is strictly Lockeant. Then
it will turn out that Cleo’s strategy for responding to the charge of
irrationality that (bTheo, cTheo) faces from the Accuracy Dominance Ar-
gument will not work as it stands. The problem is that any such pair
will be dominated. The crucial feature of Cleo’s state in the presence
of the non-strict Lockean Thesis and the original version is that all of
the credence functions that accuracy dominate her credence function
— that is, cCleo — belong to Lockeant states whose belief function is not
bCleo. Thus, if Cleo were to move to one of those credence functions,
she’d be forced to abandon her belief function, and at some worlds
that loses her accuracy that is not compensated for by the accuracy
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she gains by moving to the dominating credence function. This is not
the case for a state (bTheo, cTheo) that satisfies the strict Lockean The-
sis. At least some of the credence functions that dominate cTheo belong
to Lockeant states that include bTheo. Let c∗ be such a credence func-
tion. So c∗ accuracy dominates cTheo when accuracy is measured by
Is; and (bTheo, c∗) is strictly Lockeant. Thus, (bTheo, c∗) accuracy dom-
inates (bTheo, cTheo) when accuracy is measured by Ii,s, however i is
defined. Figure 3 illustrates the point.
Is this, then, a move that the proponent of the Accuracy Dominance
Argument for Probabilism might make? Might she save the argument
by moving to the normative or metaphysical version of the strict Lock-
ean Thesis, rather than adopting the analytic version of the original
Lockean Thesis?
This move would certainly allow her to retain the claim that credal
and categorical doxastic states are distinct existences. However, there
are two problems with this move: First, the normative version of the
strict Lockean Thesis is uncomfortable, at least for someone who sub-
scribes to Veritism, as the proponent of the Accuracy Dominance Ar-
gument does. After all, as we saw in §4, it is the weaker original ver-
sion for the Lockean Thesis that is justified by considerations of ex-
pected accuracy. If an agent has a credence t in X and 1− t in X, and
if her inaccuracy measure for categorical doxastic states is i (where
i(i, S) = N = 1− t), then her expected inaccuracy for suspending judg-
ment on X and her expected inaccuracy for having a full belief in X are
equal. But the strict version of the Lockean Thesis rules out having a
full belief in X as irrational, and demands that the agent suspends judg-
ment on X. Thus, any normative version of the strict Lockean Thesis
must appeal to some source of irrationality beyond accuracy consider-
ations to explain the normative difference between full belief in X and
suspension in X when they have equal expected inaccuracy. And this
is what Veritism is intended to rule out.
The other problem with this move is that it only avoids the origi-
nal version of Cleo’s response. Cleo noted that her Lockeant state isn’t
dominated by any other Lockeant state. We have now seen that any
w11− t t
1− t
t
w2
cTheo
c∗
Figure 3: Suppose (bTheo, cTheo) is a strictly Lockeant state, where cTheo is
as shown. Thus, bTheo(X) = B and bTheo(X) = S. Now, cTheo is dominated
by c∗. Therefore, (bTheo, c∗) dominates (bTheo, cTheo). And it is easy to see
that (bTheo, c∗) is a strictly Lockeant state as well. But notice that c∗ is also
dominated by further credence functions that give rise to bTheo via the strict
Lockean Thesis with threshold t. Indeed there is no strictly Lockeant state that
dominates (bTheo, cTheo) but is not itself dominated. In fact, this is true of
any strictly Lockeant state whose credal component is not probabilistic: it is
accuracy dominated by further strictly Lockeant states, but not by any strictly
Lockeant state that is itself undominated.
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strictly Lockeant state is dominated by another strictly Lockeant state.
But, as we saw briefly above, being dominated is not sufficient for ir-
rationality. What is sufficient for rationality is being dominated by an
option that is not itself dominated. And it is easy to see that, while any
strictly Lockeant state — such as (bTheo, cTheo) — is accuracy domi-
nated, every strictly Lockeant state that dominates it is itself accuracy
dominated by another strictly Lockeant state. Thus, it seems that those
states too are not rendered irrational by the Accuracy Dominance Ar-
gument for Probabilism.
7. Conclusion
In sum: We have seen that, if categorical doxastic states — such as
full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment — are distinct
existences, and if they are connected by the metaphysical or normative
versions of the Lockean Thesis, then the Accuracy Dominance Argu-
ment for Probabilism fails: there are total doxastic states that include
non-probabilistic credence functions that are not accuracy dominated
when their total inaccuracy is considered. On the other hand, if they
are not distinct existences and are instead connected by the analytic
version of the Lockean Thesis, then the Accuracy Dominance Argu-
ment for Probabilism succeeds.
In this paper, we have considered only one other type of doxas-
tic attitude, namely, the categorical attitudes. But there are others. For
instance, comparative attitudes are captured by an ordering of propo-
sitions, X is at most as likely as Y, which we write X  Y. And there is a
natural analogue of the Lockean Thesis for these attitudes: c(X) ≤ c(Y)
iff X  Y. If these are distinct existences, they might contribute differ-
ently to the inaccuracy of the total state of which they are a part (cf. [Fi-
telson, ms]). And then similar issues might arise as arose in this paper.
I leave open the question of how accuracy considerations for credences
interact with accuracy considerations for other doxastic states.6
6. I am very grateful to the following people for very helpful discussion of ear-
lier versions of this paper: Branden Fitelson, Carlotta Pavese, Kenny Easwaran,
8. Appendix: Proofs of Theorems 3, 4, and 5
In this appendix, we prove Theorems 3, 4, and 5. First, we pick our
inaccuracy measures:
• Let s be a continuous, normalised strictly proper scoring rule that
generates a connected inaccuracy measure Is.
• Let i be defined as follows, where t > 0.5:
– i(1, B) = i(0, D) = R = 0
– i(0, B) = i(1, D) = W = 1
– i(1, S) = i(0, S) = N = 1− t
So
Ii(b, w) := ∑
X∈F
i(w(X), b(X))
Then the inaccuracy of a total doxastic state (b, c) is as follows:
Ii,s((b, c), w) := Ii(b, w) + Is(c, w)
Now, let c be a credence function on F = {X, X} such that c(X) = t
and c(X) = 1− t + ε (where 0 < ε < 2t− 1). We write this, using the
vector notation, as c = (t, 1− t+ ε). And let b be the belief function on
F such that b(X) = B and b(X) = S. Thus, (b, c) is Lockeant. Moreover,
• Ii,s((b, c), w1) = Ii(b, w1) + Is(c, w1) = Is(c, w1) + N = s(1, t) +
s(0, 1− t + ε) + 1− t
• Ii,s((b, c), w2) = Ii(b, w2) + Is(c, w2) = Is(c, w2) + 1 + N =
s(0, t) + s(1, 1− t + ε) + 2− t
Jason Konek, an anonymous referee for this journal, and everyone involved in
the symposium on Branden Fitelson’s Coherence manuscript at Duke University
in May 2014. I was supported by an ERC Starting Researcher Grant ’Epistemic
Utility Theory: Foundations and Applications’ during his work on this paper.
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DB
DS
DD
SB
SS
SD
BB
BS
BD
t1− t
t
1− t
w1
w2
c
Figure 4: DB marks the set of credence functions that belong to Lockeant
states whose belief functions assign disbelief to X and belief to X. And simi-
larly for others.
Our next step is to divide the Lockeant states that consist of belief
and credence functions defined on F into nine sets, corresponding to
the nine different combinations of belief, disbelief, and suspension that
an agent might have towards X and X. Thus, we write BB for the set of
Lockeant states in which the agent believes both; we write DS for the
set of Lockeant states in which the agent disbelieves X and suspends
on X; and so on. These are marked in Figure 4. Now we list certain
facts about the relationship between the inaccuracies of (b, c) at the
worlds w1 and w2 and the inaccuracies of a Lockeant state that falls in
one of these sets.
1. (b∗, c∗) ∈ DB:
(a) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1) = Is(c∗, w1) + 2
(This is because b∗ gets both categorical doxastic states wrong at
w1.)
(b) Is(c∗, w1) > Is(c, w1).
(This is because s(1, x) is a decreasing function of x and s(0, x)
is an increasing function of x.)
2. (b∗, c∗) ∈ DS:
(a) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1) = Is(c∗, w1) + 1+ N = Is(c∗, w1) + 1+ 1− t
(This is because b∗ gets one categorical doxastic state wrong at
w1 and suspends on the other.)
(b) Is(c∗, w1) ≥ s(1, 1− t) + s(0, 1− t)
(This is because the credence function in DS that has lowest
inaccuracy at w1 is c∗ = (1− t, 1− t).)
3. (b∗, c∗) ∈ SB:
(a) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1) = Is(c∗, w1) + 1+ 1− t
(This is because b∗ gets one categorical doxastic state wrong at
w1 and suspends on the other.)
(b) Is(c∗, w1) ≥ s(1, t) + s(0, t)
(This is because the credence function in SB that has lowest in-
accuracy at w1 is c∗ = (t, t).)
4. (b∗, c∗) ∈ DD:
(a) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1) = Is(c∗, w1) + 1
(This is because b∗ gets one categorical doxastic state wrong at
w1 and the other right.)
(b) Is(c∗, w1) ≥ s(1, 1− t) + s(0, 0) = s(1, 1− t)
(This is because the credence function in DD that has lowest
inaccuracy at w1 is c∗ = (1− t, 0).)
5. (b∗, c∗) ∈ BB:
(a) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1) = Is(c∗, w1) + 1
(This is because b∗ gets one categorical doxastic state wrong at
philosophers’ imprint - 17 - vol. 15, no. 16 (june, 2015)
richard pettigrew Accuracy and the credence-belief connection
w1 and the other right.)
(b) Is(c∗, w1) ≥ s(0, t) + s(1, 1) = s(0, t)
(This is because the credence function in BB that has lowest in-
accuracy at w1 is c∗ = (1, t).)
6. (b∗, c∗) ∈ SS:
(a) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1) = Is(c∗, w1) + 1− t + 1− t
(This is because b∗ suspends on both propositions.)
(b) Is(c∗, w1) ≥ s(1, t) + s(0, 1− t)
(This is because the credence function in SS that has lowest in-
accuracy at w1 is c∗ = (t, 1− t).)
7. (b∗, c∗) ∈ BS:
(a) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1) = Is(c∗, w1) + 1− t
(b) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w2) = Is(c∗, w2) + 1+ 1− t
8. (b∗, c∗) ∈ SD:
(a) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1) = Is(c∗, w1) + 1− t
(b) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w2) = Is(c∗, w2) + 1+ 1− t
9. (b∗, c∗) ∈ BD:
(a) Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w2) = Is(c∗, w2) + 2
(This is because b∗ gets both categorical doxastic states wrong at
w2.)
(b) Is(c∗, w2) > Is(c, w2).
(This is because s(1, x) is a decreasing function of x and s(0, x)
is an increasing function of x.)
Now suppose that we pick threshold t > 0.5 such that the following
holds:
(A) s(1, t) + s(0, 1− t)− s(1, 1− t) < t
(B) s(1, t) + s(0, 1− t)− s(0, t) < t
This is always possible, since s(0, t) is a strictly increasing function of
t and s(1, t) is a strictly decreasing function of t.
Then let b = (B, S) and c = (t, 1 − t + ε). We wish to show the
following: there is ε > 0 such that
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ DB, SB, DS, DD, BB, SS, then
Ii,s((b, c), w1) < Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1)
So (b∗, c∗) does not dominate (b, c).
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ BS, SD, then
Ii,s((b, c), w1) < Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1)
or
Ii,s((b, c), w2) < Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w2)
So (b∗, c∗) does not dominate (b, c).
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ BD, then
Ii,s((b, c), w2) < Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w2)
So (b∗, c∗) does not dominate (b, c).
To do this, we show that these inequalities hold for ε = 0. Then, noting
that s is continuous, we note that there must therefore be some ε > 0
for which they continue to hold. Thus, note that, for ε = 0, and in the
presence of (A) and (B), we have:
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ DB, then, by (1),
Ii,s((b, c), w1) = Is(c, w1)+ 1− t < Is(c∗, w1)+ 2 = Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1)
So (b∗, c∗) does not dominate (b, c).
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ DS, then, by (2),
Ii,s((b, c), w1) = s(1, t) + s(0, 1− t + ε) + 1− t
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< s(1, 1− t) + s(0, 1− t) + 2− t < Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1)
So (b∗, c∗) does not dominate (b, c).
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ SB, then, by (3),
Ii,s((b, c), w1) = s(1, t) + s(0, 1− t + ε) + 1− t
< s(1, t) + s(0, t) + 2− t < Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1)
So (b∗, c∗) does not dominate (b, c).
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ DD, then, by (4) and (A),
Ii,s((b, c), w1) = s(1, t) + s(0, 1− t + ε) + 1− t
< s(1, 1− t) + 1 ≤ Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1)
So (b∗, c∗) does not dominate (b, c).
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ BB, then, by (5) and (B),
Ii,s((b, c), w1) = s(1, t) + s(0, 1− t + ε) + 1− t
< s(0, t) + 1 ≤ Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1)
So (b∗, c∗) does not dominate (b, c).
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ SS, then, by (6),
Ii,s((b, c), w1) = s(1, t) + s(0, 1− t + ε) + 1− t
< s(1, t) + s(0, 1− t) + 2− 2t < Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w1)
So (b∗, c∗) does not dominate (b, c).
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ BS accuracy dominates (b, c) relative to Ii,s, then, by
(7), c∗ accuracy dominates c relative to s. But, since Is is connected,
we know that all credence functions that accuracy dominate c are
in SS. So (b∗, c∗) does not accuracy dominate (b, c).
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ SD accuracy dominates (b, c) relative to Ii,s, then, by
(8), c∗ accuracy dominates c relative to s. But, since Is is connected,
we know that all credence functions that accuracy dominate c are
in SS. So (b∗, c∗) does not accuracy dominate (b, c).
• If (b∗, c∗) ∈ BD, then, by (9),
Ii,s((b, c), w2) = Is(c, w2) + 1+ 1− t
< Is(c∗, w2) + 2 = Ii,s((b∗, c∗), w2)
So (b∗, c∗) does not dominate (b, c).
Thus, there is ε > 0 such that the above inequalities hold. For that ε,
we have that ((B, S), (t, 1− t + ε)) is undominated.
This result allows us to prove our two theorems:
• Proof of Theorem 3 It is straightforward to calculate that, if we let
t = 0.7 and 1− t + ε = 0.6, the above inequalities hold, and thus
(bCleo, cCleo) = ((B, S), (0.7, 0.6)) is undominated. 
• Proof of Theorem 4 Note that, for all t > 0.5,
– q(1, t) + q(0, 1− t)− q(1, 1− t) = 2(1− t)2 − t2 < t
– q(1, t) + q(0, 1− t)− q(0, t) = 2(1− t)2 − t2 < t
Then let b = (B, S) and c = (t, 1− t + ε). 
• Proof of Theorem 5 If s is a normalised strictly proper scoring rule
that generates a connected inaccuracy measure Is. Then we simply
pick r such that
– s(1, r) + s(0, 1− r)− s(1, 1− r) < t
– s(1, r) + s(0, 1− r)− s(0, r) < t
As noted above, this is always possible. Moreover, for t > r, these
inequalities continue to hold. Then let b = (B, S) and c = (t, 1− t +
ε). 
This completes our proofs. 
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